Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

Date of Degree

6-2025

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Program

Political Science

Advisor

Michael Lee

Committee Members

Peter Liberman

Peter Romaniuk

Subject Categories

Defense and Security Studies | International Relations | Peace and Conflict Studies | Political Economy

Keywords

sanctions, major powers, Iran, nuclear weapons, human rights, United Nations

Abstract

This dissertation examines the conditions under which sanctions-sending states can successfully mobilize broad international support for coercive measures on a target state for violating international security norms. Using the case of international sanctions on Iran from 2006 to 2016, I develop a theory of how sanctions senders mobilize support for, and cooperation with, coercive measures on target states. The theory has two parts. First, states seeking international sanctions against a target with broad participation and support need unity and cooperation on the part of major powers in the international system. Second, securing the unity and cooperation of major powers makes it possible to broaden support for coercive measures among a critical mass of other states. The lead sanctions senders, typically democracies, first need the support and cooperation of democratic major powers. Democratic major powers’ cooperation on sanctions is bolstered by their membership in a pluralistic security community. But their support for coercive measures ultimately depends on whether they believe the international security threat the measures are intended to contain is real. Non-democratic major powers Russia and China are not part of that pluralistic security community, though they may share some of the security concerns. Non-democratic major powers usually condition their support on securing specific incentives: exemptions from the coercive measures, a narrowing of their scope, or some other compensation. With major powers united, it is possible to bring most of the rest of the world along for the ride. Unity among major powers opens the door to a United Nations Security Council endorsement and large-scale bandwagoning of support among small and middle- power states. I show the decisive importance of major-power cooperation across six post-Cold War cases of violations of international security norms in which lead sanctions senders sought to build broad international support for coercive measures on a target state. The main case study is sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program in 2006-2016, which I analyze using in-depth interviews with former senior government officials and diplomats, government documents, and other sources. I also apply my theory to five other cases: Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait; North Korea’s nuclear weapons; Syria’s atrocities against civilians and use of chemical weapons; Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; and the first Trump administration’s attempt to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran. I also examine a more recent trend of democratic governments joining forces to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities to promote human rights and other norms, inspired by the 2016 US Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. With non-democracies hostile to Global Magnitsky-style sanctions, democratic sanctions senders have had to rely on small ad hoc coalitions for coordinated multilateral sanctions actions, rather than global-scale coalitions. This reinforces my theory about the importance of major-power cooperation to secure broad international support for coercive measures.

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